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Prior to 1997, homeowners under 55 were allowed to defer capital gains taxes from a 
home sale if they bought another house at least as expensive, while those over 55 
received a capital gains exclusion regardless of the cost of their new home. The Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97) eliminated this differential tax treatment.  We exploit the 
differential treatment before 1997 to uncover TRA97’s effects.  Comparing homeowners 
under 55 before and after 1997, we find that those who moved after 1997 are twice as 
likely as to list “seeking less expensive housing” as a reason for moving, 8 percent less 




William  H.  Hoyt      Amelia  M.  Biehl* 
Department of Economics and                                   Department of Economics 
Martin School of Public Policy                                  University of Southern Indiana 
Gatton College of Business and Economics               Evansville, IN 
University of Kentucky                                               abiehl@usi.edu  























While there is a lengthy literature on the federal tax-subsidy to owner-occupied housing, less 
attention has been paid to another aspect of the tax code that provides favorable treatment of 
housing. Prior to 1997, the U.S. Federal Income Tax Code allowed homeowners aged less than 
fifty-five to rollover capital gains taxes from the sale of a home if they bought up -- that is, if they 
purchased another house within two years that was at least as expensive as their previous home.  
Homeowners age fifty-five and older were treated differently, as they received a one-time capital 
gains tax exclusion from the sale of an owner-occupied home, up to $125,000.  In 1996, the U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget (OMBA) estimated tax expenditures of $5.2 billion from the 
exclusion of capital gains from taxation for those over age fifty-five and $14.4 billion from the 
deferral (rollover) of capital gain taxation for those under age fifty-five. To give some perspective, 
the tax expenditure associated with the deductibility of state and local property taxes was estimated 
to be $15.9 billion and the expenditure from the deductibility of mortgage interest payments was 
$47.5 billion in 1997.
1 
With the passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), the differential treatment of 
homeowners over and under the age of fifty-five was eliminated.  After 1997, the first $250,000 
($500,000) in capital gains from the sale of a single (married) owner-occupier’s primary residence is 
tax exempt, regardless of the homeowner’s age and whether they purchase more or less housing 
following the sale of their residence. For most homeowners, this effectively eliminated capital gains 
taxation from the sale of a primary residence, as the median home price was less than the exclusion 
amount. In addition, TRA97 lowered the marginal tax rate applied to long-term capital gains from 
any assets, including housing. 
The incentives created by federal tax code prior to 1997 for households under age fifty-five 
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to purchase a more expensive house than their previous one, or “buy up” to defer capital gains taxes 
have been of particular interest to economists.  If, instead, a homeowner bought a less expensive 
home or “bought down” and had a capital gain, taxes were paid on the difference between the 
values of two homes up to the maximum of the capital gain.  Thus, an incentive to buy more ex-
pensive homes as well as to own, not rent, was created. 
In addition to the incentive to “buy up”, the differential tax treatment of homeowners under 
age fifty-five from those older than fifty-five may lead to a “lock-in” effect – the incentive for home-
owners under age fifty-five to defer selling their home if they desire a less expensive one or to switch 
to the rental market.  The term “lock-in” often refers to stockholders retaining appreciated stocks in 
an effort to avoid capital gains taxation.  Most recently, Sinai and Gyourko (2004), and Lang and 
Shackelford (2000) use the changes in capital gains tax rates associated with TRA97 to find 
capitalization of capital gains taxes in stock prices.  Guenther (1999) also studies TRA97 and finds 
evidence consistent with the idea that shareholders who anticipated capital gains tax reductions 
delayed selling appreciated stock.  This being the case, the pre-TRA97 differential taxation of capital 
gains should be expected to reduce the mobility of those under the age of fifty-five. 
  In this study we use data from both before and after the enactment of TRA97 to examine its 
impact on both household mobility and housing consumption. This is in contrast to studies 
including Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990, 1992), Burman et al. (1996), Newman and Reschovsky (1987) 
and Sinai (1998) that use data from well before 1997 to examine the impacts of changes in capital 
gains taxation on housing consumption or household mobility. Only two other studies of which we 
are aware, Bier et al. (2000) and Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007), have examined this law using 
data after TRA97’s enactment.   
  We examine the impacts of TRA97 on the likelihood that households affected by TRA97 
move by exploiting the difference in treatment of those under and over age fifty-five before TRA97   3
to do a difference-in-difference analysis of the impacts of TRA97 on housing decisions. This is 
similar to what Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007) did using data on households from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). While the CPS provides information on whether the household has recently 
moved, it does not provide information about the characteristics of a respondent’s housing.  Our 
source of data, the American Housing Survey (AHS), provides much more information about both 
housing characteristics and the reasons a household had for moving.  Unlike Cunningham and 
Engelhardt, we have what we believe is a good proxy for whether households moved down, their 
responses to a question about their reason for moving.  We, then, can better determine whether 
TRA97 did, in fact, reduce the “lock-in” of households into larger homes than they desired, 
providing additional identification of the impact of TRA97 on the “lock-in” effect.  We examine the 
effects of TRA97 both immediately after its passage, in 1998-1999, as well as several years later, 
2002-2005, in an effort to uncover whether the effects of TRA97 are purely transitory or whether 
they have a lasting impact on the housing market.   
  The information from the AHS on housing characteristics, including whether the household 
owns or lives in a single-family residence, enables us to address the issue examined by Hoyt and 
Rosenthal (1990, 1992) and Burman et al. (1996) -- how changes in capital gains taxation affected the 
consumption of housing, an issue not examined by either of the “post TRA97” studies by Bier et al 
(2000) and Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007).    
As a result of TRA97, some of the previous homeowners under age fifty-five who purchased 
more expensive homes prior to 1997 are expected to purchase less expensive homes after 1997, as 
this legislation eliminated the incentive to purchase more housing to avoid capital gains taxes.  
Further, households under age fifty-five are expected to be more likely to move and, specifically, to 
move down.  While it is true that homeowners over age fifty-five were affected by TRA97, as it 
increased the level of capital gains exempt from taxation and lowered capital gains tax rates, we do   4
not expect these changes to lead to significant changes in their behavior in housing markets, unlike 
our expectations for those under age fifty-five.  Exploiting the fact that TRA97 differentially affects 
those over and under fifty-five allows identification of some of the effects it has had on the housing 
market.  Specifically, this allows us to see if homeowners under age fifty-five, who are no longer 
locked-in to their current level of housing consumption, moved down after 1997.   
Our empirical evidence on mobility, consistent with Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007), 
suggests that homeowners under age fifty-five are more likely to move.  Perhaps more telling of the 
impacts of TRA97 is that while households under the age of fifty-five are more likely to move after 
1997, the difference appears to be attributable entirely to increases in the likelihood of moving to 
less expensive residences after 1997.  Homeowners under age fifty-five who move after 1997 are 
about twice as likely as homeowners under the age of fifty-five before 1997 to list “seeking less 
expensive housing” as a reason for moving, an effect that does not disappear over time.   
Further, we find evidence that households affected by TRA97 are less likely to be locked-in 
to “mismatched” housing, by which we mean a level of housing consumption that does not reflect 
their current demand.  Specifically, we find that homeowners under age fifty-five affected by TRA97 
are eight percent less likely to own their residences in the two years after TRA97’s enactment, an 
eleven percent decrease in the homeownership rate.  In addition, these homeowners are also about 
nine percent less likely to live in a single family home.  However, we find no evidence that 
households are still mismatched in 2002-2005.   
We proceed as follows: in the next section we discuss the effects of capital gains taxation on 
housing consumption.  The third section discusses our data while the fourth section presents our 
empirical model and the results of our estimation. The fifth section reporting results from our 
falsification test.  Finally, our last section offers some concluding remarks.   
The Impacts of Capital Gains Taxation on Housing Markets   5
In this section we briefly describe the impact that capital gains taxation has on the after-tax 
price of housing and, through its impacts on the after-tax price of housing as well as wealth, its 
impacts on housing consumption and mobility. After TRA97, with a few exceptions, homeowners 
do not pay capital gains taxes on the sale of their primary residence.
2  Prior to 1997, capital gains 
taxes are due if a homeowner under age fifty-five purchases a less expensive home (moves down).  
Then, ‘young’ homeowners (those under the age of fifty-five) who bought down pay capital gains 
taxes in the amount of  
)] ( , min[ o
o HR V t tG T − =          ( 1 )  
where T  is total capital gains taxes paid, t is the marginal income tax rate facing an owner-occupier, 
G  is the capital gains from the sale of the home, V
o is the sales price of the home, H is the stock of 
housing in the home, and R0 is the rental cost of owner-occupied housing as defined by Rosen 
(1979).   
  Because the capital gains taxes paid on the sale of a previous home depends on the house-
hold’s current choice of housing, homeowners face different prices of housing depending on the 
quantity of their new housing consumption relative to their previous consumption.  This is illu-
strated in Figure 1, where X represents all other goods, Y is income, P is the price of housing and r is 
the household’s discount rate.  Segment 1 illustrates the budget constraint for a homeowner who buys 
a more expensive home and therefore faces the price Ro.  Segment 2 corresponds to a homeowner 
who moves down but considers a house of value such that they do not pay tax on the full capital 
gain ( ) G HR V o
o < − .  This being the case, increases in housing consumption reduce the amount 
paid in capital gains taxes and the effective price of housing is Ro(1-t) on this section.  Finally, for the 
homeowner whose capital gain exceeds the difference between the value of their previous home and 
                                                 
2Homeowners are still required to pay capital gains taxes on homes that are not their primary residence and homes that 
they have not lived in for two of the last five years.  In cases where their realized gain is larger than their exclusion 
amount they owe taxes on the difference.     6
their current, less expensive home, small changes in housing do not change the amount of capital 
gains taxes paid making the price Ro. This case is represented by Segment 3 in the figure. 
  Some homeowners who, prior to 1997, purchased a home of approximately equal value to 
their previous home may have chosen to buy a less expensive home than their previous one in the 
absence of capital gains taxation.  An example of this phenomenon is found in Figure 2, which con-
tains both the pre-1997 and post-1997 budget constraints for a household under fifty-five with a 
capital gain from the sale of a home. While this household located at the “kink” under the pre-1997 
budget constraint, that is the value of its current and previous houses are the same, under the post-
1997 linear budget constraint the household will clearly purchase less housing. 
Data 
  The data for our analysis comes from the American Housing Survey (AHS), which contains 
detailed housing characteristics, demographic information about household heads and their house-
holds, and information about recent moves.  Metropolitan surveys are available for 1995, 1996, 
1998, 2002 and 2004.  In these five years, between six and fifteen areas were surveyed annually, with 
at least 3,200 housing units from each area. While samples are taken from the same metropolitan 
areas for some of the years, this is not a longitudinal data set -- that is, we do not observe the same 
households in more than a single year. We also use a subset of the 1995, 1999 and 2003 AHS 
National survey.  Including only observations with geographic identifiers from these waves leaves us 
with data on houses in six of the largest metropolitan areas.  In an effort to ensure that our 
treatment group and comparison group do not have differential trends, we also restrict the sample to 
those between the ages of forty-five and sixty-five, those reasonably near pre-TRA97 age cut-off 
point.  Similar to Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007), we exclude householders who are exactly age 
fifty-five.  Therefore, our treatment group includes homeowners age forty-five to fifty-four and our 
comparison group is made up of homeowners age fifty-six to sixty-five.       7
Unfortunately, unlike earlier waves of the AHS, the waves from the 1990’s do not report the 
value of the household’s previous home. Thus, unlike Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990, 1992), we cannot 
directly determine if homeowners actually moved down. However, we can exploit a number of the 
questions asked in the AHS to indirectly address the issue of whether a household was likely to have 
purchased a more or less expensive home.  
  Our primary measure of whether a household moved down is their response to a question 
regarding the reason why they moved.  One of their choices is “a desire for a less expensive home.”  
Here, we treat a household choosing this as reason for moving as a household that did, in fact, move 
down.  While we concede that “a desire for a less expensive home” may not necessarily mean they 
are living in a less expensive home, we still believe that this response is a good indication that the 
household is likely to have moved down.  Specifically, we find it very unlikely that a household 
would list this as a reason for having moved if it bought a more expensive home.  It is also possible 
that households that do, in fact, move down may not list “a desire for a less expensive home” as a 
reason for buying down. To the extent that this is the case, we would be underestimating the num-
ber of households that move into less expensive homes following TRA97.
3 Other reasons for 
moving, such as changes in employment or financial reasons may also result in buying down.  How-
ever, since households can list multiple reasons for moving, our concerns about alternative reasons 
are somewhat reduced.  
 The  AHS provides other measures of downward movement and “mismatch” that enable us 
to address the question of whether a household moved down.  The AHS includes information 
about previous and current tenure, which is used to examine changes in the probability that 
homeowners choose to rent rather than own their primary residence.  Homeowners under age fifty-
five are expected to be less likely to own their home after 1997, as they can now shift to renting 
                                                 
3 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this point to our attention.   8
without paying a capital gains tax.  We also explore changes in the probabilities of a homeowner 
moving to a single family home.  In this sample, the average price of a single family home is greater 
than that of any other owner-occupied housing.  Therefore, young previous homeowners are 
expected to be less likely to own a single family home after TRA97.   
  While individually none of these measures is perfectly correlated with buying a less expensive 
home, we believe that together evidence of changes in the desire to live in a less expensive home, 
renting rather than owning and purchasing a single-family dwelling provide a good measure of 
whether households under fifty-five years of age are more likely to buy down after TRA97. 
 The  variables  TRA971 and TRA972 are designed to capture the effects of the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997.  TRA971 is an indicator variable equal to one if a householder is under age fifty-
five and the year is 1998 or 1999. This variable is designed to capture the effects of TRA97 on the 
housing market immediately after its enactment.  Similarly, TRA972 is an indicator variable equal to 
one if a household is under age fifty-five and the year is 2002, 2003, or 2004 and is designed to 
capture any lasting effects associated with TRA97.  Again, we expect homeowners under age fifty-
five to be more likely to move down or move to renting immediately after 1997, as they no longer 
have a tax incentive to move up.  Similarly, homeowners who previously purchased a more 
expensive house to avoid capital gains taxation are expected to move down immediately after 1997.     
  In constructing these TRA97 variables homeowners over age fifty-five, those that may have 
moved down without penalty prior to 1997, serve as the comparison group.  Although this tax 
legislation did, in fact create a “natural experiment,” as homeowners under and over the age of fifty-
five went from being treated completely differently by the tax code to exactly the same, we cannot 
deny the fact that TRA97 also changed the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing for households 
over age fifty-five as well.  The exemption limit amount for all homeowners is $250,000 or $500,000 
depending on their marital status, an increase from $125,000 for homeowners over the age of fifty-  9
five, with the exemption no longer limited to once in a lifetime.  In addition, TRA97 eliminated the 
deferral of taxes with all gains on sales above the exclusion taxed in the year they are sold.  Finally, 
TRA97 lowered the long-term capital gains tax rates from fifteen and twenty-eight percent to ten 
and twenty percent. While it is not the case that those over the age of fifty-five were unaffected by 
TRA97, as their housing decisions may be influenced by it, it is certainly the case that TRA97 has a 
different impact on the incentives of homeowners over and under the age of fifty-five to move and 
the amount of housing they purchase. Thus, our results are best interpreted as the impacts of 
TRA97 on the housing market behavior of homeowners under age fifty-five relative to those over age 
fifty-five.   
Observed Differences across Time and the Age of Homeowners 
Those who moved in 1997 could use the old or the new capital gains tax rules.  Therefore, in 
an effort to exclude homeowners who moved in 1997 from the sample and to ensure consistency, to 
be considered a mover the householder had to report moving in the sample (calendar) year.   
  Table 1 summarizes variable means by homeowner age and the year of the sample.   In Table 
1a we contrast the differences in the characteristics between those age forty-five to fifty-four with 
those age fifty-five to sixty-five before TRA97 (1995-1996) and shortly after it (1998-1999). Table 1b 
reports the variable means when consider the same sample before TRA97, but our sample after it is 
from a later period (2002-2004). By dividing the sample after TRA97 into these two subsamples we 
are able to discover whether or not the effects of TRA97 on housing markets are transitory.  
From Table 1a we can see that about three percent of the sample of those under the age of 
fifty-five before TRA97 reported moving due to a desire for a less expensive home, while almost 
seven percent of the sample under the age of fifty-five after TRA97 reported moving for a less 
expensive home.  Four percent more recent movers listed this reason for moving immediately after 
TRA97 than did prior to TRA97, a difference that is significant at the five percent level.  For the   10
sample of those over the age of fifty-five, as expected, the difference in these percentages was not 
statistically different before and after TRA97, consistent with TRA97 not affecting those over age 
fifty-five. Therefore, as can be seen in the “difference in difference” column, column (g), after 1997 
previous homeowners under age fifty five are 5.4 percent more likely to “desiring a less expensive 
residence” as a reason for moving than those over age fifty-five.   
Table 1a also shows the fraction of owner-occupiers and the fraction of previous 
homeowners living in a single family home.  The fraction of owner-occupiers under age fifty-five 
decreased from 74.6 percent in 1995-1996 to 70.6 percent in 1998-1999, a difference that is 
significant at the five percent level.  Consistent with our expectation, there is no significant 
difference in the likelihood of owner-occupation for previous homeowners over age fifty-five.  The 
percentage of previous homeowner under age fifty-five living in a single family home also decreased 
from seventy-two percent before 1997 to sixty-five percent after TRA97.  Again, there is no 
statistical difference in the likelihood of residing in a single family home before and after 1997 for 
those over age fifty-five.  Nonetheless, changes in this probability will be examined further in the 
next section, where we control for other aspects that may affect a household’s reason for moving.   
 As  mentioned,  Table 1b reports the differences in previous homeowners before TRA97 and 
several years after, specifically between 2002 and 2004.  If TRA97 only had a transitory effect on the 
housing market, then the likelihood of reporting “moving for a less expensive home,” owner-
occupation and residing in a single family home should not change between 1995-1996 and 2002-
2004.  As can be seen in column (c) the probability of a previous homeowners under age fifty-five 
moving for a less expensive residence increased from about three percent prior to 1997 to about 
seven percent after TRA97, a change in likelihood consistent with the effects of TRA97 not being 
entirely transitory.  Again, there is no statistical difference for those over age fifty-five.     11
  Table 1b also shows the fraction of owner-occupiers and the fraction of previous 
homeowners residing in a single family residence.  The rate of owner-occupation for previous 
homeowners under fifty-five  decreased from seventy-five percent to sixty-seven percent from 1995-
1996 to 2002-2004.  However, there is also some change in the owner-occupation rate of previous 
homeowners over fifty-five.  Therefore, according to column (g), previous homeowners under age 
fifty-five are about four percent less likely to be owner-occupiers than those over fifty-five, a 
difference that is significant at the ten percent level.  Those under and over age fifty-five are less 
likely to reside in a single family home, and the difference between the two is not statistically 
different.  However, these too need to be examined with more rigor, as other variables that may 
affect the reason a household moves need to be controlled for.   
The Empirical Model   
While our simple difference-in-difference exercise suggests that homeowners under the age 
of fifty-five are more like to move down after TRA97, it does not reveal whether the movement 
downward is simply due to changes in sample composition or if TRA97 is, in fact, responsible for 
these differences.  To examine this question, we estimate a number of probit models that control for 
important determinants of housing demand that may well differ between the samples before and 
after TRA97 while exploiting the differential treatment of TRA97 on older and younger home-
owners using difference-in-difference estimation.   
Summary of Specifications 
 AfterTRA97 households are no longer subject to taxation on capital gains less than $500,000 
for a married couple ($250,000 for single household) even if they purchase less expensive homes. 
Therefore, we expected them be more mobile.  As an initial test of this prediction, we estimate a 
probit model where the dependent variable equals one if the household moves.  Explanatory 
variables such as age, race, gender, marital status, number of children, education and income are   12
included. TRA97 is accounted for via an indicator variable equal to one if the household head is 
under fifty-five years of age and therefore has not had a chance to purchase another residence 
without being subject to capital gains taxation, and the year is after 1997.  Again, in an effort to 
measure both transitory and longer-term effects of TRA97, we use data both from immediately after 
TRA97’s enactment (1998-1999) as well as data from several years later (2002-2004).  More formally, 
we estimate a model of the form 
it t it it it it o it Year D A TRA TRA Move P ε β β β β β + + + + + + = = 3 3 2 2 1 1 97 97 ) 1 (    (4) 
where the subscript i and t denote householder i in year t.  TRA971 equals one if the household head 
is under age fifty-five and it is immediately after the enactment of TRA97, either 1998 or 1999.  
TRA972 equals one if the household head is under age fifty-five and it has been at least five years 
since the enactment of TRA97, which includes 2002-2004 in this sample.  The term Ait represents 
indicator variables for the age of the primary householder (Age 50-54, Age 56-59, and Age 60+) while 
the term Dit  is a set of additional variables describing the household.  This set of variables indicates 
if the primary householder is female, Caucasian, married has completed high school and whether he 
or she has a Bachelors degree.  Also included is the number of children under the age of eighteen in 
the household.  In addition, in some specifications, we include a family-size adjusted measure of 
income, which is real family income divided by the square-root of household size.
4  In a number of 
specifications we include the interaction of these variables with the year of the sample and the age of 
the householder. 
 While  TRA97 should affect the overall likelihood of moving for those under the age of fifty-
five, the legislation should only influence households who want to buy down, as those who want to 
buy up were never locked-in.  We consider several ways to examine whether TRA97 induced home-
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equivalence scales.     13
owners to purchase less expensive homes.  Using a sample of previous homeowners who moved in 
the calendar year, we estimate several probit equations using their response to whether they listed 
wanting to buy down as a reason for moving as proxy for moving down.   
In addition to examining the likelihood of moving or moving down as measured by a report 
of desiring less expensive housing, we also see if homeowners under age fifty-five respond to 
TRA97 by making other choices generally consistent with buying down.  After 1997, previous 
homeowners under the age fifty-five are expected to be less likely to choose homeownership, as they 
can now move to renting without paying a capital gains tax.  Again, we estimate this choice with a 
probit model using only the sample of previous homeowners.  In this case, the dependent variable 
equals one if a previous homeowner chooses to own and zero otherwise.  
  A similar probit model is utilized to see if young previous homeowners are less likely to 
make a single family home their primary residence post-TRA97.  In our sample, the average price of 
a single family home is greater than that of any other owner-occupied housing.  Again, after 1997 
most homeowners can move down without a capital gains tax penalty, so they are expected to be 
less likely to choose a single family home.  
Results 
Capital Gains Taxation and Mobility 
  Homeowners affected by TRA97 are expected to be more mobile after 1997, as those who 
would like buy down are no longer locked-in by capital gains taxation.  As can be seen in column (a) 
of Table 2, neither of the two variables that we use to capture the effects of TRA97, TRA971 and 
TRA972, are statistically significant.  While one would expect TRA97 to increase the probability of 
moving by inducing those homeowners who desire less housing to move, the results do not support 
this prediction for all households between ages forty-five and fifty-four.     14
If we narrow the sample to those between the ages of fifty-two and fifty-eight, a sample 
similar to that of Cunningham and Engelhardt (2002), and those living in MSA’s with above-average 
house price indexes
5 our results are quite different.  As homeowners in above-average house price 
indexes MSA’s have larger capital gains, they were more likely to be locked-in prior to TRA97.  The 
results of this estimation are found in column (b) of Table 2.
6  As can be seen from our estimation of 
the coefficient for TRA971, we find that those who were between the ages of fifty and fifty-four 
prior to 1997 are 2.2 percent more likely to move immediately after TRA97’s enactment (significant 
at the five percent level).  This represents an eighty-eight percent increase in the probability of 
moving for this sub-group, an increase comparable to the seventy-three percent change 
Cunningham and Engelhardt (2007) found in states in the top half of the house price appreciation 
distribution.  However, the coefficient for TRA972 is insignificant for this sample, so there is no 
indication that TRA97 has a lasting effect-- that is, there is no evidence that it increased mobility in 
2002-2004.   
Similarly, column (c) of Table 2 shows a statistically significant impact of TRA97 on mobility, 
which includes interactions of year and MSA fixed effects.  Due to data limitations, the year fixed 
effects are dummy categories for 1995-1996, 1998-1999 and 2002-2004, instead of a dummy for 
each year.  However, the results are quite similar, suggesting that in the years immediately after 
TRA97 homeowners were 2.4 percent more likely to move, a ninety-six percent increase in the 
mobility rate for homeowners age fifty-two to fifty-eight in MSA’s with above average house price 
appreciation.     
Capital Gains Taxation and Buying Down  
                                                 
5 MSA house price indexes, which measure average price changes in homes purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac, were obtained from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, and means were computed for 
each year in the sample.   
6Tables 2-4 do not report all coefficient estimates. However, these are reported in tables in the Appendix.   15
  Table 3 reports the results of our estimation of whether previous homeowners who moved in 
the calendar year reported desiring less expensive housing as a reason for moving.  In all five of our 
specifications, we find a statistically significant impact of TRA97 on the probability of buying down.  
Column (a) reports the results of our probit estimation of whether those households who moved 
reported desiring less expensive housing as a reason for moving.  Our results suggest that a home-
owner between the ages of forty-five and fifty-four who moved immediately after 1997 was 5.4 
percent more likely to list moving for a less expensive residence as a reason for moving than a 
similar homeowner/mover age fifty-six to sixty-five prior to 1997.  Dividing the marginal effect by 
the sample mean, we find that this represents an eighty-seven percent increase in the probability of 
choosing this as a reason for moving.  We also find evidence that previous homeowners affected by 
TRA97 are 4.7 percent more likely to choose wanting a less expensive place as a reason for moving 
five years after TRA97’s enactment, in 2002-2004, suggesting that the effects of TRA97 are not 
solely transitory.   
  In column (b) we interact age categories with demographic variables and find similar results.  
Those affected by TRA97 were eight percent more likely to move for a less expensive residence in 
1998-1999 and almost six percent more likely to do so in 2002-2004.   
Column (c) includes family size adjusted income, which is real family income divided by the 
square-root of household size.  These results are similar, suggesting that previous homeowners 
affected by TRA97, who moved in the calendar year, are approximately eight percent more likely to 
move for a cheaper place in 1998-1999 and almost six percent more likely to do so in 2002-2004.   
Column (d) interacts family size adjusted income with year and age dummies.  Again we find 
that previous homeowners affected by TRA97 are about eight percent more likely to move for a less 
expensive place in 1998-1999, an increase of 131 percent.  Similar results are found in 2002-2004,   16
where previous owners are about six percent more likely to move for a cheaper place, an increase of 
one hundred percent.   
Finally, column (e) includes MSA indicators.  Consistent with our previous findings, those 
affected by TRA97 are about twelve percent more likely to move for a less expensive residence in 
1998-1999, representing a 187 percent increase in this likelihood.  TRA97 appears to still have an 
effect on the housing market several years after its passage, as affected homeowners are seven 
percent more likely to move for a cheaper place in 2002-2004, a 111 percent increase.   
Column (f) of Table 3 has similar results and includes MSA-year interactions.  Data 
limitations prevent us from using dummies for each year in this specification, so year categories, 
1995-1996, 1998-1999 and 2002-2004, are used instead.  Our results suggest that homeowners 
affected by TRA97 are about seven percent more likely to list wanting a cheaper place as a reason 
for moving in the two years following TRA97’s enactment, an increase of 106 percent.  Similarly, 
affected recent movers are about four percent more likely to list this reason for moving in 2002-
2005, a sixty-eight percent increase in the probability of moving to a less expensive residence.   
Capital Gains Taxation and Housing Mismatches 
  In Table 4 we report the results of our estimation of how TRA97 affects our other measures 
of “mismatch” and buying down: the likelihood of renting and the likelihood of residing in a single-
family dwelling. Our results are consistent with a reduction in housing consumption for those 
households affected by TRA97 in 1998-1999.  Based on our probit results reported in column (a), 
we find that recent movers who owned their previous home and were affected by TRA97 are eight 
percent less likely to own a home in 1998-1999, an eleven percent decrease in the homeownership 
rate for this group.  However, we do not find any evidence that these previous homeowners are less 
likely to be owner-occupiers five years after TRA97’s enactment.  Similarly, when we include MSA-
year interaction terms, as in column (b), affected previous homeowners in the recent mover sample   17
are about nine percent less likely to be owner-occupiers in 1998-1999, a thirteen percent decrease in 
the rate of owner-occupation.  Again, we find no evidence that TRA97 affects the decision to be an 
owner-occupier in the years 2002-2004.   
In 1998-1999, affected previous homeowners who recently moved are also nine percent less 
likely to move to a single family home according to the estimated marginal effects associated with 
column (c), representing a thirteen percent decrease in the likelihood of this group residing in a 
single family home.  Again, we find no evidence that TRA97 is still affecting single family home 
sales in 2002-2004.  When we include MSA-year interactions we obtain similar results.  Previous 
homeowners in the recent mover sample who are affected by TRA97 are eight percent less likely to 
reside in a single family home in the two years after the enactment of TRA97, which represents an 
eleven percent decrease in the probability of living in a single family home.  However, we do not 
find evidence that TRA97 has an impact on the probability of living in a single family home five 
years after its enactment.   
Overall, our results suggest that in 1998 and 1999, previous homeowners affected by TRA97 
were more likely move, more likely to list wanting a less expensive residence as a reason for moving, 
and conditional on being in the recent mover sample, less likely to be owner-occupiers and less likely 
to live in a single family home.  In contrast, we find no evidence that TRA97 increased the 
likelihood of households moving between 2002 and 2004, nor is there any evidence suggesting that 
those households affected by TRA97 are less likely to live in either owner-occupied or single-family 
homes during this period.  However, we find evidence that recent movers affected by TRA97 were 
more likely to move for a cheaper place between 2002 and 2004, offering some indication that 
TRA97 has a lasting effect on downward mobility.   
Falsification Test   18
   To ensure that the age groups used in our analysis do not have differential trends that may 
be driving our results, we also report the results of falsification tests for each of our specifications.  
We should not see a differential trend between homeowners under and over age fifty-five in 1995 
and 1996, as there was not a policy change that differentially affected them.  To test this, we set up a 
fake treatment group in which homeowners under age fifty-five are “affected” by a fictitious 1996 
policy change.  The coefficient estimate for homeowners under age fifty-five in 1996 should be 
insignificant, if, in fact, our comparison groups do not have differential trends.  The results of this 
estimation are reported in Table 5.  The false TRA97 variable is not statistically significant at any 
traditionally acceptable level, giving us confidence that homeowners age fifty-six to sixty five are an 
acceptable comparison group for homeowners age forty-five to fifty-four.   
Conclusion 
  The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 drastically changed the tax treatment of capital gains from 
the sale of a home for those under age fifty-five by effectively eliminating the capital gains tax 
burden for a homeowner’s primary residence.  In contrast, the legislation did not significantly alter 
the tax treatment of housing for those over fifty-five, allowing for the use of difference in difference 
estimation to explore the effects of TRA97 on the housing market, specifically on homeowners 
under age fifty-five.   
  We find evidence that in the years 1998-1999, TRA97 increased the mobility of homeowners 
between the ages of fifty and fifty-four, specifically those who we expected to want to move down a 
priori.  Further, consistent with what we would expect as a result of TRA97, previous homeowners 
are more likely to move down in 1998-1999.  Those affected by TRA97 were more likely to list 
wanting a less expensive home as a reason for moving, less likely to be owner-occupiers and less 
likely to reside in a single family home.  While the data does not allow us to know with certainly   19
whether a household moved down, the evidence we find on the impacts of TRA97 suggests that 
TRA97 has induced homeowners to consume less housing in the two years following its enactment.   
Previous homeowners who moved in the past year were also more likely to move to a less 
expensive home in 2002-2004, suggesting that TRA97 has a lasting effect on downward mobility.  
However, we find no evidence that TRA97 has a lasting impact on our measures of mismatch, 
owner-occupation and residing in a single family home.   
 The  passage  of  TRA97 may well be expected to influence other aspects of the housing 
market.  TRA97 expands the favorable tax treatment of housing, making it an even better 
investment after 1997.  However, our analysis indicates that households under age fifty-five are more 
likely to spend less on their primary residence than they did previously.  Chung (2006) notes that 
second home sales have increased drastically since 1997, and therefore, it may be that housing 
investment has increased, but not in the primary residence market, though this conjecture has yet to 
be explored rigorously.   
Bier et al. (2000) notes that capital gains tax code prior to 1997, by encouraging homeowners 
to move up, also encouraged outward migration, as expensive homes within the city were difficult to 
find.  If his assertion is correct, homeowners post-1997 are expected to move inside city limits, and 
lot sizes are expected to get smaller.   
Finally, we have looked at the impact of TRA97 on mobility and housing purchases in the 
years immediately following 1997 and several years later.  It appears as though homeowners who 
were locked-in to mismatched housing prior to 1997 readjusted in 1998-1999, increasing the 
mobility rate.  However, TRA97 seems to have a more lasting effect on the decision of a recent 
mover to move to a less expensive unit.   
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
 
Table 1a: Summary Statistics for 1995-1996 versus 1998-1999 
















(a) (b)  (c) (d) (e)  (f)  (g) 
   Mean  Mean  (b) - (a)   Mean  Mean  (e) - (d)  (c) - (f) 
Less expensive residence as 
reason for moving  0.029  0.069  0.040** 0.081  0.067 -0.014  0.054* 
Owner-Occupied 0.746  0.706  -0.040** 0.766  0.774  0.008  -0.048* 
Single Family Home  0.715  0.651  -0.064*** 0.679  0.645  -0.034 -0.030 
White 0.881  0.824  -0.057***  0.894 0.847  -0.047***  -0.010 
Female 0.375  0.431  0.056*** 0.388  0.431  0.043* 0.013 
Married 0.608  0.609  0.001  0.590 0.580  -0.010  0.011 
Children (#)  0.609  0.744  0.135*** 0.212  0.271  0.059* 0.076 
Complete high school  0.925  0.930 0.005 0.841  0.849 0.008  -0.003 
Have a bachelors degree  0.386  0.442 0.056*** 0.263  0.317 0.054**  0.002 
Family-size adjusted income  49642  54887  5245***  44206  47600  3394*  1851 
Observations  2232  1196     1118  634       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 1b: Summary Statistics for 1995-1996 versus 2002-2004 















(a) (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)  (g) 
   Mean  Mean  (b) - (a)   Mean  Mean  (e) - (d)  (c) - (f) 
Less expensive residence as 
reason for moving  0.029  0.067  0.038** 0.081  0.079 -0.002  0.040 
Own  0.746  0.671 -0.075*** 0.766 0.733  -0.033*  -0.042* 
Single Family Home  0.715  0.660  -0.055*** 0.679  0.630 -0.049**  -0.006 
White 0.881  0.815  -0.066***  0.894 0.852  -0.042***  -0.024 
Female 0.375  0.456  0.081*** 0.388  0.452  0.064***  0.017 
Married 0.608  0.566  -0.042*** 0.590  0.579  -0.011 -0.031 
Children (#)  0.609  0.670  -0.061** 0.212  0.131  -0.081***  0.020*** 
Complete high school  0.925  0.917  -0.008 0.841  0.904  0.063***  -0.071*** 
Have a bachelors degree  0.386  0.403 0.017 0.263  0.378  0.115***  -0.098*** 
Family-size adjusted income  49642  63564  13922***  44206  58705  14499***  -577 
Observations  2232  1797     1118  961       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   22
 
Table 2 
















Age 52-58  
Above Average House 
Price Indexes 
           
Affected by TRA97 0.051  0.420**  0.360* 
(1998-1999) (0.79)  (2.05)  (1.81) 
           
     Marginal Effect     0.021  0.024 
     Sample Mean     0.025  0.025 
     Percent Change     84.0%  96.0% 
           
           
Affected by TRA97 -0.008  0.102  0.071 
(2002-2004) (0.13)  (0.59)  (0.42) 
           
           
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Income  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x MSA Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
           
           
Age Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Income  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
          
Demographics Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
          
Family Size Adjusted Income  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
          
MSA Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  No 
          
Observations 60457  7165  7376 
Log-likelihood value  -7066  -805  -826 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0276  0.0592  0.0409 
1. All specifications are estimated using probit models.  Demographics includes marital status, number of children, 
educational attainment, race and sex.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.   
2. Due to data limitations, year category dummies (1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2004) are used instead of a dummy for 
each year.   
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%      23
 
Table 3 
The Likelihood of Moving to a Less Expensive House  
   (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)2 
Sample  Recent Movers, Ages 45 - 65
1  
                   
Affected by TRA97 0.526*  0.749**  0.745**  0.820** 1.149*** 1.031** 
(1998-1999) (1.66)  (2.11)  (2.10) (2.23) (2.70) (2.39) 
                   
     Marginal Effect 0.054  0.080  0.079  0.081 0.116 0.066 
     Sample Mean  0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 
     Percent Change  87.1%  129.0% 127.4% 130.6% 187.1% 106.5% 
                   
                    
Affected by TRA97 0.495*  0.634**  0.634**  0.727** 0.937** 0.910** 
(2002-2004) (1.75)  (2.02)  (2.02) (2.25) (2.51) (2.40) 
                    
     Marginal Effect 0.047  0.059  0.058  0.062 0.069 0.042 
     Sample Mean  0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 0.062 
     Percent Change  75.8%  95.2% 93.5%  100.0%  111.3%  67.7% 
                   
                    
Year  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     x Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Income  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x MSA fixed effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
                    
                    
Age  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     x Demographics  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Family Size Adjusted Income  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                    
Demographics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                    
Family Size Adjusted Income  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
(entered as quadratic)                  
MSA  Fixed  Effects  No No No No Yes No 
                    
Observations  1596 1582 1582 1582 1426 1386 
Log-likelihood  value  -338 -326 -326 -320 -280 -281 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1015  0.1316 0.012 0.1467 0.231 0.2178 
1.  All specifications are estimated using probit models and a sample of previous homeowners, ages forty-five 
to sixty-five who moved in the sample year.  Demographics include marital status, number of children, 
educational attainment, race and sex.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.   
2. Due to data limitations, year category dummies (1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2004)  are used instead of a 
dummy for each year.   
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
    24
 
Table 4 















Sample  Previous Homeowners 
             
Affected by TRA97 -0.249**  -0.258**  -0.242**  -0.225** 
(1998-1999) (2.23)  (2.32) (2.30)  (2.15) 
            
     Marginal Effect -0.081  -0.085  -0.087  -0.080 
     Sample Mean  0.729  0.676  0.676  0.729 
     Percent Change  -11.1% 12.60% -12.9%  -11.0% 
              
             
Affected by TRA97 -0.088  -0.095  -0.033  -0.030 
(2002-2004) (1.06)  (1.14) (0.41)  (0.38) 
              
             
Year Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Income  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x MSA Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
              
             
Age Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Demographics  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
     x Family Size Adjusted Income  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
Demographics Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
              
Family Size Adjusted Income  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
(entered as quadratic)            
MSA Fixed Effects  Yes  No  Yes  No 
             
Observations 7334  7334  7332  7332 
Log-likelihood value  -3591  -3604  -3817  -3836 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1615  0.1585  0.1737  0.1694 
1.  All specifications are estimated using probit models.  Demographics include marital status, number of 
children, educational attainment, race and sex.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.   
2. Due to data limitations, year category dummies (1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2004)  are used instead of a 
dummy for each year.   
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 5: Falsification Tests 
  
Falsification for Table 3:  
Likelihood of Moving 
Falsification for Table 4:  
Likelihood of Moving to a Less Expensive House 
Falsification for Table 5:  
Likelihood of Moving to Owner-
Occupation or a Single Family Home 
    (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (a) (b) (c) (d) 
TRA97 false  -0.028  -0.085 -0.085 -0.294 0.140 0.117 -0.213  -2.129 -2.129 -0.095 -0.095 -0.064 -0.064
   (0.30)  (0.23) (0.23) (0.64) (0.23) (0.19) (0.32) (1.56) (1.56) (0.84) (0.84) (0.58) (0.58) 
Observations    7819  1902  1902  498 423 423 423 290 290  3339  3339  3347  3347 
Log-likelihood value  -2034  -176  -176  0.0998 0.2332 0.2345 0.2673 0.6024 0.6024 -1557 -1557 -1650 -1650 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0295  0.0753 0.0753 -81  -66 -66 -63 -30 -30  0.1684 0.1684 0.1891 0.1891  26
 
 Figure 1: Budget Constraint for Homeowners under age fifty-five prior to 1997.   
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Figure 2: Budget constraint before and after TRA97: Homeowners at the kink move down after 
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Appendix:  Extended Tables 


















Above Average House 
Price Indexes5 
Affected by TRA97  0.051  0.420**  0.360* 
     1998-1999  (0.79)  (2.05)  (1.81) 
Affected by TRA97  -0.008  0.102  0.071 
     2002-2004  (0.13)  (0.59)  (0.42) 
Age 50 to 54  -0.163  0.442  0.464 
 (1.31)  (1.04)  (1.16) 
Age 56 to 60  -0.276**       
   (2.00)       
Age 60 to 65  -0.497***       
   (3.29)       
Married -0.150**  -0.422  -0.244 
   (1.97)  (1.23)  (1.36) 
# Children  0.025  0.418**  0.114 
   (0.74)  (2.52)  (1.02) 
Complete High School 0.172  5.144***  0.624 
   (1.35)  (4.56)  (1.62) 
Bachelors Degree  0.089  0.344  0.128 
   (1.28)  (1.15)  (0.76) 
Female -0.137*  -0.080  0.015 
   (1.84)  (0.24)  (0.09) 
Family-size adjusted 0.0000004  0.000003 0.0000002 
real income  (0.42)  (0.64)  (0.08) 
White 0.076  0.366  0.384 
   (0.76)  (0.86)  (1.57) 
Observations 60457  7165  7376 
Log-likelihood value  -7066  -805  -826 
Pseudo R-squared  0.0276  0.0592  0.0409 
1. All specifications are estimated using probit models.  Demographics includes marital status, number of children, 
educational attainment, race and sex.  Also included, but not reported are year and MSA dummies and interactions of 
demographic variables with year and age.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.   
2. Due to data limitations, year category dummies (1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2004)  are used instead of a dummy for 
each year.   
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    
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Table 3: Likelihood of Moving to a Less Expensive House 
1 
   (a) (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)2 
Affected by TRA97  0.526*  0.749** 0.745** 0.820**  1.149***  1.031** 
     1998-1999  (1.66)  (2.11)  (2.10) (2.23)  (2.70) (2.39) 
Affected by TRA97  0.495*  0.634** 0.634** 0.727**  0.937** 0.910** 
     2002-2004  (1.75)  (2.02)  (2.02) (2.25)  (2.51) (2.40) 
Age 50 to 54  0.256*  0.943 0.944  0.879  1.108  1.324* 
   (1.86)  (1.46)  (1.46) (1.34)  (1.61) (1.90) 
Age 56 to 60  0.514**  0.786 0.782  0.672  0.802  1.220 
   (2.09)  (1.04)  (1.04) (0.88)  (0.99) (1.51) 
Age 61 to 65  0.821***  1.381* 1.397*  1.094  1.156  1.230 
   (3.21)  (1.81)  (1.83) (1.39)  (1.35) (1.46) 
Married -0.296  -0.761* -0.742* -0.780*  -0.989**  -0.906** 
   (0.89)  (1.92)  (1.87) (1.83)  (2.02) (2.42) 
# Children  0.106  0.212  0.204 0.202  0.296 0.225 
   (0.63)  (1.07)  (1.02) (0.96)  (1.19) (1.00) 
Completed High School  0.277 0.750  0.762  0.728  0.617  0.566 
   (0.54)  (0.99)  (1.01) (0.94)  (0.75) (0.86) 
Bachelors Degree  -0.487  -0.403 -0.392  -0.413  -0.357  0.255 
   (1.31)  (0.96)  (0.93) (0.92)  (0.68) (0.70) 
White -0.167  0.006  0.019 -0.039  -0.219 0.360 
   (0.41)  (0.01)  (0.04) (0.08)  (0.38) (0.73) 
Female -0.327  -0.393  -0.389 -0.506  -0.446 -0.098 
   (0.93)  (0.97)  (0.96) (1.22)  (0.91) (0.28) 
Family-size adjusted       -0.0000007  -0.0000002  -0.000005  -0.000009 
real income        (0.29) (0.03)  (0.63) (1.42) 
Family-size adjusted        -0.0000000000007 -0.00000000001 -0.00000000002  -0.00000000002 
real income squared        (0.09)  (0.9)  (1.26)  (1.33) 
Observations 1596  1582  1582  1582  1426  1386 
Log-likelihood value  -338  -326  -326  -320  -280  -281 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1015  0.1316 0.1323  0.1467  0.231  0.2178 
1.  All specifications are estimated using probit models and a sample of previous homeowners who moved in the sample year.  
Demographics include marital status, number of children, educational attainment, race and sex.  Also included, but not 
reported are year and MSA dummies and interactions of demographic variables with year and age.  Absolute value of t-statistics 
in parentheses.   
2. Due to data limitations, year category dummies (1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2004)  are used instead of a dummy for each 
year.   
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 5: Likelihood of Moving to a Less Expensive House 
1 
   Owner-Occupied Owner-Occupied5  Single Family Home  Single Family Home2
Affected by TRA97  -0.249**  -0.258**  -0.242**  -0.225** 
     1998-1999  (2.23)  (2.32) (2.30) (2.15) 
Affected by TRA97  -0.088  -0.095  -0.033  -0.030 
     2002-2004  (1.06)  (1.14) (0.41) (0.38) 
Age 50 to 54  0.343***  0.316**  0.062  0.062 
   (2.58)  (2.40)  (0.47)  (0.47) 
Age 56 to 60  0.274*  0.251  0.241  0.244 
   (1.77)  (1.63)  (1.58)  (1.62) 
Age 61 to 65  0.372**  0.343*  0.247  0.249 
   (2.02)  (1.88)  (1.39)  (1.42) 
Married 0.873***  0.822*** 0.899*** 0.901*** 
   (9.42)  (11.32) (10.16) (12.70) 
# Children  0.120***  0.136*** 0.282*** 0.276*** 
   (2.61)  (3.49)  (5.69)  (6.65) 
Bachelors Degree  0.138 0.106  0.242***  0.158** 
   (1.52)  (1.49)  (2.75)  (2.25) 
White 0.579***  0.473***  0.427***  0.321*** 
   (4.65)  (5.09)  (3.39)  (3.43) 
Female 0.216**  0.196*** -0.004  0.071 
   (2.37)  (2.75)  (0.05)  (1.02) 
Family-size adjusted  0.00001*** 0.00001*** 0.000007***  0.000008*** 
real income  (8.18)  (10.39) (5.20)  (7.38) 
Family-size adjusted  -0.00000000002***  -0.00000000002*** -0.00000000001*** -0.00000000001*** 
real income squared  (7.88) (7.97) (6.54)  (6.62) 
Observations 7334  7334  7332  7332 
Log-likelihood value  -3591  -3604  -3817  -3836 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1615  0.1585  0.1737  0.1694 
1.  All specifications are estimated using probit models and a sample of previous homeowners.  Demographics include marital 
status, number of children, educational attainment, race and sex.  Also included but not reported are year and MSA dummies 
and interactions of demographic variables with year and age.  Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses.   
2. Due to data limitations, year category dummies (1995-1996, 1998-1999, 2002-2004)  are used instead of a dummy for each 
year.   
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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